

EXPLORING HEIDEGGER'S CONCEPT OF LANGUAGE: AN INTERPRETATION OF CONVERSATION THROUGH OBSERVATIONAL CONTEXT

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Abstract: Martin Heidegger's phenomenological interpretation of Aristotle's theory of rhetoric makes it possible to comprehend the observational aspect of conversation. This paper presents the meaning of Heidegger's origination of manner of speaking and investigates the ontological parts of discussion accordingly, utilizing as hypothetical sources Heidegger's 1924 Marburg address, Being and Time, as well as different messages managing the issue of the being of language. Rhetoric is the study of people's doxa, advancing our understanding of being in the world and communicating with one another, if it is a method for gaining an observational perspective on how things appear in a particular way through dialogue. Using the movie Blow-Up as a case study, a rhetorical analysis of the process of observational conversation is used to explain it.

Keywords: Rhetoric, observational discourse, language, and Heidegger.

INTRODUCTION

The ontological aspect of conversation can be explained by reading Martin Heidegger's concept of rhetoric as an observational conversation conception. It is essential to reexamine the issue of conversation in order to take into account all of its interconnected ontological and ontotic components. This paper argues that this possibility is provided by Heidegger's concept of rhetoric in his 1924 interpretation of Aristotle's Rhetoric. To demonstrate that every ontic communicative expression arises from a more primordial disclosure of the world, Heidegger's rhetorical understanding of conversation focuses on our everyday conversation experience. It demonstrates how the observational constituting structure of conversation—logos, pathos, and ethos—comes together to joyfully reveal the world to humans in a meaningful way in their fundamental mode of existence—being-in-the-world-speaking-to-one another.

After the introduction, this paper has three sections: The purpose of the first section is to provide the necessary context by highlighting the significance of Heidegger's singular appropriation of Aristotle's classical concept of rhetoric; The details of Heidegger's observational reading of rhetoric within Dasien's

disclosure structure—the hidden ontological dimension of everyday conversation that makes every conversation possible—are the focus of the following section. Through an analysis of the movie *Blow up*, the final section demonstrates this observational conversation. The place that doxa occupies within the framework of rhetoric is the final conclusion that I draw from the film analysis. Even though logos reveal the world, only rhetoric permits re-disclosure.

Situating Heidegger's Rhetoric Lecture

Using Heidegger's early writings on language, conversation, and rhetoric, I will discuss the concept of observational conversation in this section. I carve out Being and Opportunity as well as the lecture course Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy (BCAP) from 1924, both of which are relevant to the current task. However I utilize different works of Heidegger, these two texts figure in a significant way as they are impacted by Heidegger's observational appointment of Aristotle's Aspect of speaking.

A more expansive view of discourse as conversation takes into account Dasein's ontological dimension due to its connection to being. The ontic-ontological dimensions are interwoven in all conversation, whether it is reductively assertive and propositional or thoughtfully transparent. Yet, when the disillusioning idea of logos, the ontological element of Dasein's connection to language, is gotten to verbalization the demonstration of correspondence mindfully, there is a subjective contrast in the actual experience of correspondence for every one of those partaking in this cycle. In this type of conversation, the speaker and the listener no longer exist as ontologically distinct entities, as in reductive propositional conversation. This method of correspondence that allows the talk to accumulate and introduce the observational chance, which is disguised in any case when the actual event of correspondence occurs, relies upon the nature of cooperation of the communicator, the recipient and the topic. Such an assessment of potential methods of talk is examined in Heidegger's perusing of Aristotle's Aspect of speaking and this imaginative understanding is more accessibly introduced in BCAP. It emphasizes that the interpretation of human existence in relation to the fundamental possibility of speaking with one another ought to be the primary focus of rhetorical matter. Based on his concept of discourse in BT and BCAP, it is possible to define discourse as observational conversation because the encounter between Heidegger and Aristotle's Rhetoric reveals the observational dimension of discourse. In BCAP, he states that "the" (logos), which exhibits, possesses the character of definite conversation. I speak with others; Insofar as we communicate through—*koinonia*—of the world, I share the world with the other, and the other shares the world with me. Communicating by itself is speaking; and it is nothing else than "as conversation". There must be a shared world among those participating, even when everyday conversation is used. Here, "shared world" refers to a group of people who share a common culture, language, and philosophy.

However, as the following passage from Rhetoric demonstrates, Aristotle's own definition of rhetoric refers to it in terms of persuasive strategies:

The ability to observe the available means of persuasion in any given situation—the power to observe the means of persuasion on almost any subject that is presented to us—is a definition of rhetoric. According to Aristotle, because of this, we can say that because of its technical nature, it is not concerned with any particular or definite class of subjects. In contrast to Plato, Aristotle's positive understanding of rhetoric can be seen as methods of persuasive speech intended to create or change a person's perception of something in a specific way. It would appear that Aristotle's Rhetoric is a guide for the speaker on how to select the appropriate means of persuasion for a given temporal setting. But by focusing on what isn't said in the text, Heidegger brought a phenomenological understanding to the Rhetoric. According to Gross, Heidegger's interpretation has most effectively altered the relationship between rhetoric and philosophy and challenged the conventional position of rhetoric in Aristotle's writings.

Heidegger's philosophical research is related to his dissatisfaction with the formal approach to the question of meaning taken by the then-existing philosophy of language: how the interaction between language and people leads to meaning. In point of fact, in the second book of Rhetoric, Aristotle's treatment of pathos was taken seriously by Heidegger. He formulated it as the foundation from which logos emerges, expanding it beyond the psychological framework of subjective internal experience. Aristotle's oikos, koinonia/polis, ethos, and praxis are extended and modified versions of concepts like ready-to-hand, being-with, world, and Dasein. An appropriation of Aristotle's pathos, techne, and phronesis, as well as logos and hermenia, are the most crucial pillars of being and Time—the observational structures of disclosedness, attunement, understanding, and discourse. According to Daniel Gross, Heidegger's lecture's concept of rhetoric is so broad that he defines it as "the study of how a human being is in the world through language."

In comparison to studies in the philosophy of language, Heidegger's observational appropriation of Aristotle's rhetoric is a significant contribution to the issue of meaning in the everyday context. Analytical philosophy has made significant progress in addressing the issue of meaning in everyday context, developing more sophisticated theories than Aristotle's Rhetoric. One such development is the speech acts theory proposed by J. L. Austin. In the name of felicity conditions for "happy" functioning, he devised conditions for successful speech act. Speech acts lack truth values as a result, but their success can be evaluated as appropriate or inappropriate. In his 1962 book *How to do Things with Words*, Austin outlined six conditions that if broken will lead to "unhappy" outcomes, which he refers to as instances of misfires and abuses. Although Austin's theory is a step beyond propositional content and a pragmatic concept of speech as the action is certainly a further development in the philosophy of language, I would like to emphasize that such an approach is still entangled in the conventional presumptions regarding the essence of language and the human being.

Through his interpretation of Aristotle, Heidegger was able to appropriate the concept of rhetoric by appropriating the idea that rhetoric is not just about communicating techniques to stir and manipulate people, trading on their emotions with the least commitment to truth. Heidegger's original concept of language and meaning allowed him to do this. It was important for Heidegger to try to bring Aristotle's

Rhetoric back to life in his lecture for his students. In fact, when Gadamer attended the lecture as Heidegger's student, he reminisced about his experience that it was like seeing Aristotle alive as a contemporary thinker. It has additionally affected numerous understudies of Heidegger like Hanna Arendt, Helene Weiss, Walter Brouck, and Ernst Tugendhat whose commitments to Aristotelian grant is important. Reinterpreting Aristotle's fundamental ideas opened up new avenues for philosophical thought. Due to his kairological appropriation of Aristotle's fundamental concepts in a phenomenological aspect, Gadamer regarded Heidegger as an "Aristotelian redivivus". In *Being and Time* (1962), Heidegger acknowledges the significance of rhetoric in the following way:

This work of Aristotle must be regarded as the first systematic hermeneutic of the everydayness of Being with one another, in contrast to the conventional orientation that views rhetoric as something we "learn in school." Heidegger did place Aristotle's ethics within the ontological horizon of the concept of kinesis in the *Physics*, *Metaphysics*, *De anima*, and *De motu animalium*. In addition, Aristotle's rhetoric is revived. In the following section, we will first examine in greater depth Heidegger's appropriation of Aristotle's concept of rhetoric and its connection to the lifeworld. Next, we will discuss the constitutive structure of rhetoric in relation to Dasein's observational structure and mode of being in the world in greater detail.

Heidegger's Reading of Aristotle's Rhetoric

As per Heidegger, Being in the feeling of being on the planet is equiprimordial with being-with other people. Since Dasein's fundamental mode of existence is being in the world with others, Heidegger views the issue of political existence as fundamental. He asks the following question in his lecture "Being and Truth" (1933-1934), during which time he participated in political activities: what being a people means. Heidegger (2010) attempts to explain the concept of being with another by providing the following clarification:

It is impossible to understand this "with one another" as being based on the fact that there are a lot of people to keep in order; instead, we are a part of the state together, and our existence is based on the state. What's more, this presence satisfies itself and comes to fruition through talk. The science that is worried about the capacity to talk, aspect of speaking, is the principal study of people, the political theory. Since Aristotle views rhetoric as an effort to obtain a fitting response from an audience at a particular moment regarding something that matters to them, it is also possible to view it as an act of ethical performance. Indeed, rhetoric, as opposed to sophistry, is a better model of communicative ethics. In his book *Communicative Praxis and the Space of Subjectivity* (1986), Calvin Schrag describes how the Greek concept of *kathokonta* (fitting response) connects ethics and rhetoric in the space of *ethos*. Schrag penned: According to Schrag (1986), "the appropriate response is thus enjoined to do double duty": "to preserve the tradition, without which conversation could not proceed and to critique the tradition in search of a *pharmakon* [emphasis added] that might remedy its conceptual and observational ills." When guided by rhetoric, discourse can become such a *pharmakon* or therapeutic remedy because discourse in

its everydayness gives rise to either genuine discourse (in the form of the disclosure of phenomena that matter to humans) or idle talk (in the form of the phenomena that appear superficial).

Rhetoric can also be used for bad things, but the real-world situation in which people's needs call for a response presents an opportunity for a phronetic engagement based on good judgment to direct people toward what is best for them in the given situation. The "articulation of actuality by means of possibility" is brought to everyone's attention by any speaker who is aware of the temporal moment in which they and their audience are situated (Marshall, 2017). According to David Marshall (2017), these performances are not the result of exceptional talent but rather of habituation and repetition:

Our focus ought to be everydayness—as a modal category with which to organize our sense of the world's appearance and as an account of how that which is present shades absent—if we are to appropriate Heideggerian concepts for the purposes of rhetorical analysis. It is important to note that practical behavior is always fluid and never reaches perfection, whether through the use of technology or prognosis.

This ontological dimension of being—being there in a meaningful way—is the primordial way in which we encounter our world if one accepts Thomas Sheehan's understanding of Being as nothing more than the meaningful presence of things and the world to human beings (Heidegger, 2009).

1) The relative stability and constancy of the meaningful thing (währen), according to Thomas Sheehan, is what disclosures to Dasein entail;

2) the place where it makes a meaningful appearance, specifically the human concerns world ;

3) a specific transformation into appearance, the transformation of something from an undisclosed but possible intelligibility into an actual one (in die Unverborgenheit) Being with another person results in disclosedness, and someone receives the world as a result of their membership in the speech community, its culture, and its ethos; In a nutshell, the doxa, which we passively accept, is the source from which we derive meaning. The how of being-with-each other is an ontological-observational condition out of which the ontic ordinary correspondence is made conceivable and, all things considered, way of talking exhibitions are conscious enhancements of unremarkable connections and conversations among individuals. This practical application of the skill of being in the present moment is not a unique art form; rather, it is the result of Dasein's initial understanding of being in its everyday life. In point of fact, Allen Scult would go on to make the argument that the dynamics of rhetoric enable us to choose how to behave in response to the given set of language options that shape our world. Even the possibility of philosophy is included: The locus of "the how" of philosophy's being is within "how" of rhetoric's being. The new possibility of comprehending the subtly operating observational structures of everydayness arises from any situation of rupture or unexpected crisis.

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger discusses how the unexpected breakdown of everyday activities as a result of equipment failure sheds new light on them; e.g., as the shift from the ready-to-hand mode of engagement to the present-at-hand mode. Theodore Kisiel believes that the political emergency in Germany during the 1930s opened up for Heidegger additional opportunities of seeing the ontological activities that were disguised proceeding this verifiable second. Writes Kisiel (2000): "A hermeneutics of everydayness in crisis, of being with one another in an everydayness that has been radically disturbed and thus exposed, in its structures, for ready ontological examination" is Heidegger's interpretation of Aristotle's rhetoric. The world sometimes speaks to itself, and Dasein may or may not listen to the voice of being when observational possibilities in a particular crisis situation call for responses. In light of this kind of unexpected disruption to the normal routine, this observational dimension of disclosedness in the mode of being-in-the-world-along-with-others needs to be articulated in a aspect that is compatible with the people's ethos. Even if this new understanding sprouts against the common doxa, it can only be understood positively if it departs from tradition; i.e., anything that can also be otherwise. Kisiel demonstrates that the three revealing structural moments of Dasein correspond to Heidegger's observational appropriation of Aristotle's Rhetoric, which brings together the core elements pathos, ethos, and logos as always already present in any speech situation: attitude, comprehension, and conversation.

Since Dasein's relationship to its world during times of crisis should be viewed as an opportunity for genuine resolve if it is never observationally closed; Being receptive to being's conversation—acknowledging the nullity and accepting the finiteness of human life—is the only way to be open and listen to the silent call of conscience. The expression of the saying of being is a manifestation of such an experience. At such minutes, presence imparts to Dasein in a uninvolved way for it to effectively suitable the importance of presence. This de facto response of Dasein to the call of Being demonstrates that Being does in fact require humans to articulate the world's rupture, exposure, and disclosure in Dasein's explicit discourse. Stuart Elden believes that the logos are the best chance that people will interact with one another. The distinction between speaking and listening is only useful analytically in this realm of observational conversation. Elden (2005) contends that —Logos is plausible of individual, which carries it to the most noteworthy chance of its being, the euzen. In any case, this is as of now not simple logos, yet dialektos, talking with others, hermeneia, pushing toward a comprehension with others. Therefore, speaking and listening are one and the same. In accordance with the future orientation of its temporal structure of care, dasein is a type of being that is observationally driven by non-being. Sheehan elaborates on this: —flawed being incites a blemished locus of importance: the world as a dynamic and transitory meditational space. Hence, Dasein in its ordinary concern exists as talking with others (arranging, examining, battling) based on its observational construction, which is constantly situated towards the not yet acknowledged observational potential outcomes, primordially given in one's thrownness, which thusly decides their substantial importance right now as far as the ontic worries of one's self alongside others and the world.

The rhetorical approach to conversation amplifies the structure of conversation's inherent possibilities, effectively moving the listeners and allowing the phenomenon of interest to manifest as it is. What are the possible conditions for it? Assuming that correspondence logically comprehended is logos that carries out its role suitably regarding the ethos and feeling of the audience members, correspondence is conceivable when its constitutive components are available in a decent aspect in rationality with the doxa, temperament and the topic of the listening individuals. The observational interpretation of Heidegger's conception of "rhetoric" presents "rhetoric" with its fundamental connection to doxa and mood, in my reading of it; it is in doxa that anything is shown at first. The foundation of logos is pathos. In his discussion of the relationship between pathos and logos, Heidegger (2009) writes the following:

To the extent that is taken as talking with-each other, which has the capability of working out the understanding of being-there in its ordinariness? To the extent that the pathē are not simply an extension of psychical cycles, but rather will be somewhat the ground out of which talking emerges, and which what is communicated bounces back into, the pathē, as far as concerns them, are the fundamental prospects where being-there itself is essentially arranged toward itself, tracks down itself. It is laid out that epistemic request starts by questioning realistic. Rhetoric, on the other hand, begins and ends in doxa within the ethos of a speech community with the intention of genuinely presenting the phenomenon to the listener in its concrete attuned being-there. It aims for universal knowledge. Concisely Heidegger composes (2009) —indeed the attribute of confidence in that which shows itself at first. And the foundation for the investigation of the matter itself is that which initially appears (Heidegger, 2009). He observes the inner connection between doxa and logos: [logos], which is negotiating something, is always latent; Bringing-to-language is constantly on the lookout in [doxa]. Exactly what gives rise to and motivates speaking to one another is called "doxa"; it is also that with which it negotiates at the same time (Heidegger, 2009). Additionally, he mentions the possibility of idle talk: "There lies the possibility of its reaching a characteristic authority and stubbornness" in this structure of "doxa" (Heidegger, 2009). Hence, one can see that the locus of observational correspondence in the common world is in the doxa. As a result, the area of rhetoric is ethos because any rhetorical performance will work with, of, and eventually modify it. It is like the actual capability of theory as a likelihood that emerges from the conventional normal discussion and furthermore challenges the judicious when new basic prospects arise with reason.

Having seen the principal connection of doxa to way of talking, obviously aspect of speaking in this sense goes past the diminished thought of being a procedure occupied with influence. Rhetoric's border understanding can only be appreciated when experienced or illustrated in its real-world application. In order to demonstrate how rhetoric operates in the day-to-day life of a photographer, I will therefore present my analysis of the movie *Blow-Up* in the following section. It aims to show that, like any artistic creation, such as music, phonetic communicative performance uses all available and possible means in the given concrete context to reach its telos (Buren, 1994).

A Study of *Blow-Up*'s Rhetoric Michelangelo Antonioni's *Blow-Up* depicts the life of a young photographer (David Hemmings) in the 1960s in a way that sheds light on the possibilities of rhetoric. Rhetoric is present

in every communicative context, but rhetorical contexts only occasionally offer genuine open possibilities. The nature of Hemminge' relationship to his environment can be seen in how he interacts with the people and things around him. He is involved in his work as a London-based contemporary photographer; For a photo documentary, he takes a variety of pictures that show different aspects of the city, including violence, homelessness, and peace. He takes photographs of a youthful model as though he has her by requesting of her specific sorts of stances. He clearly demonstrates that he understands what he wants from her by controlling her with his camera. When the models do not move and maintain themselves in the way he imagines they should during a photo shoot, he loses his temper. He prioritizes his understanding of his right as a photographer over considering his subjects' emotions. Because Hemming recognizes the legitimacy of photography in terms of its capacity to capture the truth, his arrogant attitude toward female subjects can be better understood when juxtaposed with the discourse of contemporary scientific knowledge. His interactions with the models and two adolescent girls who beg him to take a picture clearly show how women are viewed as subjects in his world. At a certain point in the film the picture taker in the wake of paying attention to the discussion with a craftsman named Bill (John Palace) about the experience of suddenness in bringing the theoretical articulations out through painting, answers with an inquiry, —can I purchase it? Bill, thus, expresses —No|| to Hemmings, meaning his absence of receptivity at that point in the discussion as well as in his creative connection to things. Over the day, when Hemmings visits a secondhand store shop, an elderly person nearly pursues him away as though he realizes that the young fellow doesn't have the foggiest idea how to esteem things from an earlier time. He starts taking pictures while the shop owner is waiting for him to distract himself and relieve his boredom. He walks into a public park where he is taking random pictures of the landscape, nature, and birds. Unexpectedly, he meets a couple from a distance in the quiet atmosphere. Hemmings immediately takes pictures of a mysterious woman (Vanessa Redgrave) and an older man (Ronan O'Casey) in a business suit. The young woman sees this and runs toward him to tell him to stop taking pictures. She begged him unsuccessfully to give her the movie because she appeared to be terrified. He not only declined her request but also continued to photograph her as she moved away from him until she vanished. Then he returns to the secondhand store shop and figures out how to purchase an old propeller, which he sees as alluring. However, his handling and perception of the propeller demonstrates his propensity to immediately acquire things he finds attractive without really learning anything about them.

Soon after the buy Hemmings meets Ron for whom he works. He talks to Ron about the photos he took for the photo documentary and mentions that he took a fantastic picture in the park. Furthermore, he proposes to Ron that what he clicked in the recreation area could be put as the last photograph to end the narrative on harmony as the prior photographs depicted rough and hopeless parts of the city. He felt good about the pictures he saw at the time because he thought they showed beautiful, mysterious women, feelings of love, a green landscape with birds, and so on. After that, he returns to the studio to discover that Vanessa Redgrave was fervently interested in obtaining the film prior to its development. After she confronted him for the movie in the park, he had no idea how quickly she would appear. She fails in her efforts to seduce him in order to steal the movie. But she appears to be drawn to him, so she

gives in to his play, only for him to deceive her by giving her the wrong film roll. He begins to discover something baffling in the photographs as he begins developing them from the actual roll. When he sees something enigmatic in the gaze of one of the mysterious women, the pictures no longer evoke pleasant feelings. He further uses the gaze's direction as a clue to solve the mystery by zooming in on the area the gaze was pointing to, just like a detective would. He finally comes to the conclusion that she was looking at a gun-wielding individual hiding in the bush. It is interesting to note that there is no music during this section of the movie to emphasize the genuine, enigmatic call. The film's two main characters—the arrogant photographer and the mysterious woman—are never given names for some reason. She writes down her phone number whenever the photographer asks for her name or number. Hemmings immediately dials the phone number she gave him after discovering the truth about the attempted murder, only to discover that she gave him the wrong number. He immediately calls Ron as he begins to experience something more mysterious at this point. He talks to Ron about how he feels about taking pictures in the park until those teen "birds" that are waiting to be photographed interrupt the conversation. To demonstrate that he is unable to comprehend his emotions, I quote his words to Ron: "Something amazing has occurred." Fantastic shots taken in the park! Someone was attempting to kill another person. I saved his life. The mysterious series of events that are taking place disturb Hemming's self-perception as a photographer. He is not any more in charge of things and individuals as he used to be. Instead, everything is elusive, and the things and people around him are affecting him. He happily welcomes the distraction by welcoming the adolescent girls into the studio, probably finding it difficult to face this strange feeling. He doesn't take pictures of them yet he is playing with them. He abruptly sends them away, as if he has discovered something mysterious in one of the hanging pictures. It shows the mysterious young girl running away from him in the park just before she vanished. It is a long shot. He finally comes to the conclusion that what he sees might be a dead body lying on the ground after seeing it in various lighting conditions and magnifying that suspicious area of the picture. He is shocked once more when yet another layer of the same event that was captured in the park emerges. He immediately heads back to the park from the studio, this time without his camera. Just when he approaches the dead body did he understand that his adjusted hands couldn't arrive at the camera? When he needed it most, he realizes that he does not have the camera, which gives him so much power. He needs to click photos of the dead body yet he can't. He returns to his house, feeling helpless, to see Bill kissing his wife, Patricia (Sarah Miles). His voyeuristic longing keeps his eyes stuck. Patricia seems to like it, and she begs him not to leave because she's getting so happy. Then he gets back to his studio to find all photos created and the negative missing with the exception of one picture. That one picture is the main proof he is passed on with which is coarse because of low goal and high amplification. When Patricia meets him there, she comments on the only evidence and he explains what took place: It simply indicates that he is now unable to be certain of anything he thinks about what happened in the park, and the only picture left is so abstract that it can be interpreted in any way. "It looks like one of Bill's paintings."

Hemming rushes to meet Ron wherever he is and spots the girl in the park on his way. She is missing before he stops the car and gets to the location. He enters a music concert in vain in his search for her.

We can learn something about his unstable world from what happens there. There was chaos when the guitarist smashed his guitar and threw it at the audience. The audience suddenly erupts into a wild mob, and everyone is frantically trying to grab the broken guitar. He finally manages to get the guitar's neck after becoming enraged by the situation there. He just looks at them as soon as he escapes the frantic crowd, throws it on the ground, and walks over to Ron's place. This merely demonstrates that, while he is certain of what he desires from other photographers, he is unsure of his own world. He brought the propeller instinctually, just as he wanted to buy a Bill painting. When asked about the propeller's purpose, he replied, "Nothing, it is beautiful." Probably his words indicate that he is homeless and that his job as a photographer is really unauthentic insofar as the meaning of life comes from that job. In his earlier meeting with Ron, he did say that he wanted to be free and was unhappy with his work. When Ron provokes him on that, however, he has nothing to say about the kind of freedom he seeks. The film brilliantly depicts this enigmatic feeling through the eyes of other characters as well, which eludes language and comprehension. Even though the proprietor of the antique shop does not yet know what she wants, she is certain that she does not enjoy running the business. Patrica is dissatisfied with her marriage but is unsure of her options. Hemmings receives conversation from this observational dimension of "nothingness" in the sense that people and things are elusive, but he distracts himself with a variety of tasks that are familiar to him as the master.

He continues the narrative when he arrives at the location where Ron and Veruschka are having fun at the party. He sees Veruschka and remembers that she is supposed to be in Paris while he is trying to get Ron's attention. She responds that she is in Paris when he mentions it to her. He continues to persuade Ron that taking a picture of the dead body lying in the park is crucial. Ron, who is lost, does not feel the same urgency as him and does not understand what he is saying. In response, Ron states: He responds, "What did you see in that park?" with the statement "I am not a photographer," indicating that there is no point in persuading Ron.

Hemmings spends the night there, and when he gets up the next morning, he rushes to the park with his camera to get a shot of the dead body. It turns out that he has the camera this time, but the thing he wants to record as evidence has vanished once more. He hits the camera to show that he has given up trying to get the "truth" that his camera/eyes saw. Nothing more to hold onto as he walks with the camera in his hand without displaying the photographer as we know him from the movie. He realizes that he is actually gripped by something enigmatic, probably for the first time he does not use his camera to capture something. He watches the tennis mime performed by the same group of merrymakers as he accepts the "nothingness" and responds to what is available in the world. They don't have a racket or a ball, but a game is going on in front of his eyes. He did not immediately take pictures or distract himself; He participates in the game, on the other hand, by responding to its disclosure. He runs and tosses the ball back after everyone turned in the direction of the ball that crossed the fence and one of the players says in her embodied speech that he is expected to retrieve it. He even hears the sound of the racket hitting the ball now, indicating that he is truly free. He now understands that truth, like art, reveals itself in the

aspect desired, and that one can only be open to it to learn about it but never to master it. As he listens to what life has to say observationally, he comes to terms with both himself and the situation.

As a result, only those who are open to the rhetoric of life and art can "be free and Being speaks rhetorically in the horizon of multiple possibilities. To be free in this sense is what it means to "be" in the truest sense for human beings. The essence of being's conversation is revealed at the conclusion of Blow-Up: The way a being presents or re-presents the world by concealing itself speaks to us. At the end of the movie, the photographer himself vanishes, highlighting the fact that Being is being when it lingers in its appearances and returns in time to reveal other possibilities.

CONCLUSION

Heidegger's understanding of rhetoric states that the fundamental way humans interact with their environment is based on the primordial truth at work in conversation (truth as *aletheia*, or unconcealment or disclosure); putting it another way, open conversation. Because being reveals itself through language, *Dasein*, as being in the world, is always already communicating primordially with its world. The passive way in which humans are affected by the outside world is shown by *Dasein*'s moods or dispositions (*pathos*); that is their skepticism. Another observational characteristic that keeps *Dasein* always ahead of itself is its projection (*ethos*) of its possibilities in terms of its self-understanding based on the interpretation and comprehension of its place in society. that is, its conceptual projection. Thrown projection and these two observational aspects of *Dasein* are equiprimordial, and the discourse (*Logos*) that gathers all that is and makes them visible in its appearances (and reappearances) articulates them. *Doxa*, the observational primordial view that is attuned to its attuned understanding as a result of the discourse and language that they possess, describes how human beings exist in their everyday existence with average intelligibility.

The opportunity to observe how the subject matter presents itself in the fundamental aspect in which humans communicate with one another is the reason why rhetorical performances are so significant—which is why we frequently refer to them as "rhetoric." It amplifies these observational elements that are present in everyday life, communicate observationally, and, as a result, either maintain or alter the *doxa*—that which is accountable for the significance of one's self, the world, and other people. The analysis of the film demonstrates that the rhetorical concept of conversation does not place an emphasis on the ontological dimension as though it determines ontic expression in ontic language in the same way that one-way traffic does, but rather that the ontological coincides with ontic material expressions. The photographer's observational possibilities are made clear through this rhetorical approach to comprehending the ontological dimension of conversation: David Hemings's experience of the world as a photographer in London in the 1960s, when everything around him, including people, becomes an object in his photographs, reaches its conclusion when a particular unanticipated experience gives him new contexts on the world. As a result, our world is still revealed in a different way in the form of authentic,

meaningful, and renewed doxa when one responds to the rhetoric of being by responding to the mysterious silent call.

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