Articles | Open Access | DOI: https://doi.org/10.55640/ijefms-9148

INTRA HOUSE HOLD RESOURCE ALLOCATION AND WOMEN'S EMPOWERMENT: A COLLECTIVE MODEL PERSPECTIVE

Christabel Simuchimba , Department of Economics, Mulungushi University, Kabwe, Zambia

Abstract

"Intrahousehold Resource Allocation and Women's Empowerment: A Collective Model Perspective" examines the intricate dynamics of resource distribution within households and its impact on women's empowerment. Employing a collective model approach, this study explores how bargaining power and decision-making authority are shaped by the allocation of resources within familial units. Through empirical analysis and theoretical frameworks, the research sheds light on the complex interplay between intrafamily dynamics, cultural norms, and socioeconomic factors that influence women's agency and well-being. By elucidating these dynamics, the study contributes to a deeper understanding of gender relations and offers insights for policymakers and practitioners seeking to promote gender equality and women's empowerment.

Keywords

Intrahousehold resource allocation, women's empowerment, collective model

References

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How to Cite

Christabel Simuchimba. (2024). INTRA HOUSE HOLD RESOURCE ALLOCATION AND WOMEN’S EMPOWERMENT: A COLLECTIVE MODEL PERSPECTIVE. International Journal of Economics Finance & Management Science, 9(02), 01–07. https://doi.org/10.55640/ijefms-9148